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Abstract
We use a two-sector neoclassical open economy model with traded and non-traded
goods to investigate both the aggregate and the sectoral effects of temporary fiscal
shocks. One central finding is that both sectoral capital intensities and labor supply
elasticity matter in determining the response of key economic variables. In particular,
the model can produce a drop in investment and in the current account, in line with em-
pirical evidence, only if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded
sector, and labor is supplied elastically. Irrespective of sectoral capital intensities, a fis-
cal shock raises the relative size of the non-traded sector substantially in the short-run.
Additionally, allowing for the markup to depend on the number of competitors, the
two-sector model can produce the real exchange rate depreciation found in the data.
Finally, markup variations triggered by firm entry modify substantially the response of
the real wage and the sectoral composition of GDP in the short-run.
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1 Introduction
There has recently been a revival of interest among policy makers in the fiscal policy tool.
The fiscal transmission mechanism has also attracted considerable attention in the academic
literature. A number of papers have explored the ability of quantitative business cycle
models, both of the neoclassical and of the new Keynesian variety, to account for the data,
see Burnside, see e.g. Eichenbaum and Fisher [2004] and Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles
[2007], respectively. However, most of the analyses have been confined to closed economy
models and to one-sector frameworks. In the present paper we take up the following question
instead: to what extent can an open economy version of the two-sector neoclassical model
account for the time-series evidence on fiscal policy transmission mechanism?
Assuming that government spending is predetermined relative to the other variables
included in the vector autoregression (VAR) model, as suggested by Blanchard and Perotti
[2002], Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010] establish a first set of main findings: an exogenous increase
in government spending raises output, and lowers both investment and the current account.1
The second set of main findings relates to the labor market. Perotti [2007] documents an
increase in hours worked and in the real wage.2 The third empirical fact relates to the
impact of fiscal shocks on the sectoral composition of output. Estimates by Be´ne´trix and
Lane [2010] reveal that a boost to government spending benefits disproportionately the
non-traded sector. The fourth empirical fact relates to the shift in the relative price of
home goods. Monacelli and Perotti [2010] and Enders et al. [2011] find that government
spending yields a real exchange rate depreciation.3
To address these empirical evidence, we use an open economy with a traded and a
non-traded sector. Our neoclassical framework builds on Turnovsky and Sen [1995] and
Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003]. Like Coto-Martinez and Dixon, we allow for the non-
traded sector to be imperfectly competitive. Our work differs from that of Turnovsky and
Sen [1995] and Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] in one major respect.4 They consider the
1Such findings are consistent with the conclusions reached by Corsetti and Mu¨ller [2006], Beetsma,
Giuliodori and Klaassen [2008], and Monacelli and Perotti [2010].
2While Perotti’s [2007] conclusions are in line with those of Rotemberg and Woodford [1992] and Pappa
[2009] for the U.S., Ramey [2011] finds that hours worked increase but real wages can rise or decline on
impact, depending on the period considered. Yet, in both cases, the real wage exceed its initial level after
two years.
3The sample of countries considered by Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010], Perotti [2007], Monacelli and Perotti
[2010], comprises four countries: the U.S., the U.K., Canada and Australia. In Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010], the
period runs from 1980:1 to 2007:4, in Perotti [2007] from 1954:1 to 2003:1 for the U.S., and in Monacelli and
Perotti [2010] from 1980:1 to 2006:4. Be´ne´trix and Lane [2010] consider a panel of eleven member countries
of the euro area over the period 1970-2005. All these papers adopt the identification procedure of fiscal
shocks developed by Blanchard and Perotti [2002].
4Turnovsky and Sen [1995] investigate the effects of permanent government spending shocks by assuming
fixed labor supply. Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] introduce an elastic labor supply but restrict their
analysis to the effects of a permanent rise in public spending by assuming that the traded sector is more
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effects of permanent fiscal shocks while we examine the impact of temporary fiscal shocks
of different degrees of persistence. Beyond the fact that considering a transitory increase
in public spending allows us to address the VAR evidence, the effects of temporary fiscal
shocks can be different to those of a permanent shock.5
One attractive feature of a two-sector model with tradable and non tradable goods
is to cover both the closed economy and the open economy dimensions of contemporary
industrialized countries. In particular, the empirical evidence shows that the non-tradable
content of GDP and employment is substantial, at around two-thirds.6 From an analytical
point of view, as in a closed economy model, capital accumulation clears the home good
market, see e.g., Baxter and King [1993]. As in a small open economy, external borrowing
allows households to smooth consumption intertemporally. A second key feature of our
framework is that we can investigate the sectoral effects of fiscal shocks. Such a sectoral
decomposition of output is pivotal to understanding the fiscal transmission mechanism in an
open economy. In particular, such a model enables us to connect sectoral output responses
to the trade balance adjustment. Third, we are able to address the depreciation in the real
exchange rate which has recently been documented in the empirical literature.
Beyond the relevancy of a two-sector model for investigating the fiscal transmission
mechanism, such a framework can accommodate most of the empirical evidence mentioned
above, albeit under certain conditions. By contrast, the open-economy version of Baxter
and King’s [1993] model fails to account for the first set of observations, particularly for the
simultaneous decline of investment and the current account in response to an exogenous and
temporary increase in government spending, see e.g., Karayalc¸in [1999].7 As stressed in the
classic paper by Baxter and King [1993], a representative household responds to the higher
tax burden (which we assume to be lump-sum) by lowering consumption and increasing
labor supply. This raises the return on capital and triggers a rise in investment, which, in
turn, drives the current account into deficit. Furthermore, as the marginal product of labor
falls dramatically, the real wage fails to exceed its initial value during the transition.
One prominent feature of the time series of government spending is that its non tradable
content is substantial, at around 90%.8 We therefore concentrate on the effects of a rise
in public purchases of non-traded goods. We find that a two-sector model with traded
capital intensive. Additionally, neither Turnovsky and Sen [1995] nor Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] solve
the model numerically.
5The reason behind this result is that after a temporary fiscal shock, consumption falls much less than
after a permanent fiscal shock due to consumption smoothing behavior. Hence, if the traded sector is more
capital intensive, an excess demand (rather than excess supply) arises in the non-traded good market so
that investment is crowded out rather than being crowded in as long as the shock is transitory.
6Non tradable proportions are given in Table 3 (see Appendix A).
7Karaylalc¸in [1999] analyzes the effects of permanent and temporary fiscal shocks by using an open
economy version of the Baxter and King’s [1993] model. Regardless of its persistence, a fiscal expansion
triggers an investment boom and a current account deficit.
8The non-tradable content of government spending is reported in Table 3 for thirteen OECD countries.
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and non-traded goods can accommodate the two first sets of empirical findings, with the
exception of the rising real wage, as long as the traded sector is more capital intensive than
the non-traded sector. The explanation is intuitive. Following a fiscal expansion, agents
cut real expenditure and raise labor supply. In contrast to a small open economy model,
investment clears the home goods (or non-traded goods) market. Assuming that the traded
sector is more capital intensive, an excess demand arises in the non-traded goods market
which triggers a drop in investment. In addition, according to Rybczynski’s theorem, higher
labor supply produces a fall in traded output which in turn lowers net exports and thereby
drives the current account into deficit. Assuming that the non-traded sector is more capital
intensive, the real exchange rate appreciates which shifts resources towards the non-traded
sector so that investment is crowded in while the current account enters in deficit as a result
of the fall in traded output.
We also estimate numerically the sectoral effects of fiscal shocks to address the third
empirical fact outlined above. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, a temporary fiscal
shock benefits the non-traded sector substantially in the short-run, in line with the empirical
evidence reported by Be´ne´trix and Lane [2010]. Furthermore, our numerical results show
that, in the long run, GDP growth is mostly driven by expansion in the traded output.
The steady-state rise in traded output is necessary to compensate for the short-run current
account deficits.
Keeping the markup fixed, the predictions of the two-sector model run counter to two
of the stylized facts outlined above: the real wage does not rise and the real exchange
rate does not depreciate, irrespective of whether the traded sector is more or less capital
intensive than the non-traded sector. To address the real exchange rate depreciation and
the increase in the real wage following government spending shocks, we follow Jaimovich
and Floetotto [2008] in allowing for the markup to be endogenous. Considering that only a
limited number of intermediate good producers operate in the non-traded sector, the price-
elasticity of demand and thereby the markup faced by each firm depends on the number of
competitors.9 As the rise in government spending is expected to boost non-traded output,
a fiscal shock triggers the entry of new firms. Hence, the markup falls, regardless of sectoral
capital intensities. If the traded sector is more capital intensive, the real exchange rate must
depreciate so that the return on domestic capital equalizes the return on foreign bonds. By
exerting a positive influence on the wage rate and triggering a depreciation in the real
exchange rate, the decline in the markup can boost the real wage, although only under
certain circumstances. More precisely, the cumulative response of the real wage rate two
years after the fiscal shock becomes positive only if the fiscal shock is either short-lived
or long-lived.10 If the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, the real exchange must
9Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] consider the case of a fixed markup rather than an endogenous markup.
10A long-lived and a short-lived fiscal shock last 32 quarters and 8 quarters, respectively. In the baseline
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appreciate to equalize the return on domestic and foreign assets. As a consequence, the
real wage falls dramatically and remains below its original level over the transition towards
the steady-state.
Closely related to our paper is the study by Ramey and Shapiro [1998] who simulate a
two-sector neoclassical model with costly capital reallocation. In a similar spirit, we achieve
a better understanding of aggregate effects of fiscal shocks by investigating sectoral effects.
In contrast to our study, they consider a closed economy so that they do not address
the behavior of the current account or the real exchange rate. In addition, they do not
discuss the role of sectoral capital intensities. Finally, whereas Ramey and Shapiro analyze
the implications of costly capital mobility, we rather conduct a sensitivity analysis with
respect to the duration of the fiscal shock and the elasticity of labor supply, considering a
traded sector alternatively more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector, and
contrasting the case of a fixed markup with that of an endogenous markup.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the specification
of a two-sector model with traded and non-traded goods. Section 3 provides an analytical
exploration of the short-run and long-run effects of fiscal shocks. In section 4, we report the
results of our numerical simulations and discuss the sectoral effects of a temporary fiscal
expansion. Section 5 explores the case of an endogenous markup quantitatively, focusing
on the reactions of the real exchange rate and the real wage. In Section 6, we summarize
our main results and present our conclusions.
2 The Framework
We consider a small open economy that is populated by a constant number of identical
households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever.11 The country is small in
terms of both world goods and capital markets, and faces a given world interest rate, r?. A
perfectly competitive sector produces a traded good denoted by the superscript T that can
be exported and consumed domestically. An imperfectly competitive sector produces a non-
traded good denoted by the superscriptN which is devoted to physical capital accumulation
and domestic consumption.12 The traded good is chosen as the numeraire.13
scenario, the fiscal shock lasts 16 quarters, in line with estimates by Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010] for the U.S.
Ramey [2011] also find that a fiscal shock lasts 4 years.
11More details on the model as well as the derivations of the results which are stated below are provided
in an Appendix which is available from the authors on request.
12As stressed by Turnovsky and Sen [1995], allowing for traded capital investment would not affect the
results (qualitatively). Furthermore, like Burstein et al. [2004], we find that the non tradable content of
investment accounts for the lion’s share of total investment expenditure (averaging to 60%).
13The price of the traded good is determined on the world market and exogenously given for the small
open economy.
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2.1 Households
At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods and non-traded goods
denoted by CT and CN , respectively, which are aggregated by a constant elasticity of
substitution function:
C
(
CT , CN
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
CT
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN)φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (1)
where ϕ is the weight attached to the traded good in the overall consumption bundle
(0 < ϕ < 1) and φ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (φ > 0).
The agent is endowed with a unit of time and supplies a fraction L(t) of this unit as
labor, while the remainder, l ≡ 1 − L, is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time,
households derive utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working.
Households decide on consumption and worked hours by maximizing lifetime utility:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC − γ 1
1 + 1σL
L(t)1+
1
σL
}
e−βtdt, (2)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, σC > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion for consumption, and σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Factor income is derived by supplying labor L at a wage rate W , and capital K at a
rental rate rK . In addition, households accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t), that
yield net interest rate earnings of r?B(t). Denoting lump-sum taxes by Z, the households’
flow budget constraint can be written as:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) + rK(t)K(t) +W (t)L(t)− Z − PC (P (t))C(t)− P (t)I(t), (3)
where PC is the consumption price index which is a function of the relative price of non-
traded goods P . The last two terms represent households’ expenditure which includes
purchases of consumption goods and investment expenditure PI. Aggregate investment
gives rise to overall capital accumulation according to the dynamic equation
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t), (4)
where we assume that physical capital depreciates at rate δK . In the rest of this paper, the
time-argument is suppressed to increase clarity.
Denoting the co-state variable associated with eq. (3) by λ the first-order conditions
characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C = (PCλ)
σC , (5a)
L =
(
λ
γL
W
)σL
, (5b)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (5c)
rK
P
− δK + P˙
P
= r?, (5d)
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plus the appropriate transversality conditions. In an open economy model with a represen-
tative agent having perfect foresight, a constant rate of time preference and perfect access
to world capital markets, we impose β = r? in order to generate an interior solution. This
standard assumption made in the literature implies that the marginal utility of wealth, λ,
will undergo a discrete jump when individuals receive new information and must remain
constant over time from thereon, i.e. λ = λ¯.
The homogeneity of C(.) allows a two-stage consumption decision: in the first stage,
consumption is determined, and the intratemporal allocation between traded and non-
traded goods is decided at the second stage. Applying Shephard’s lemma gives CT =
(1− αC)PCC and PCN = αCPCC, with αC being the share of non-traded goods in the
consumption expenditure.
2.2 Firms
Both the traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital, KT and KN , and labor, LT
and LN , according to constant returns to scale production functions, Y T = F
(
KT , LT
)
and Y N = H
(
KN , LN
)
, which are assumed to have the usual neoclassical properties of
positive and diminishing marginal products. Both sectors face two cost components: a
capital rental cost equal to rK , and a labor cost equal to the wage rate W . The traded
sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive. As described in more details below, the
non-traded sector contains a large number of industries and each industry is comprised of
differentiated monopolistically competitive intermediate firms.14
The final non-traded output, Y N , is produced in a competitive retail sector with a
constant-returns-to-scale production which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral
non-traded goods.15 We denote the elasticity of substitution between any two different
sectoral goods by ω > 0. In each sector, there are N > 1 firms producing differentiated
goods that are aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good. The elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties within a sector is denoted by ² > 0, and we assume that this is
higher than the elasticity of substitution across sectors, i.e. ² > ω (see e.g., Jaimovich and
Floetotto [2008]). Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that
produces one variety is a price setter. Output Xi,j of firm i in sector j is produced using
capital and labor, i.e. Xi,j = H (Ki,j ,Li,j). Each firm chooses capital and labor by equaliz-
14This assumption relies upon observed empirical facts. The markups in the traded sector we estimated
for a sample of 13 OECD economies average to 1.2 with small dispersion across countries whereas for the
non-traded sector, the markups average to 1.4 with large dispersion across countries. Additionally, assuming
that the traded sector is imperfectly competitive would not affect qualitatively the results, as long as the
markup is fixed. Estimates of the markups charged by the traded sector are available on request while
estimates for the non-traded sector are reported in Table 3.
15This setup builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto’s [2008] model. Details of its derivation are therefore
relegated to the Appendix, which is available on request.
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ing markup-adjusted marginal products to the marginal cost of inputs, i. e. HK/µ = rK ,
and HL/µ = W , where µ is the markup over the marginal costs. At a symmetric equi-
librium, non-traded output is equal to Y N = NX = H (KN , LN). We assume that there
are a large number of firms within each sector, so that each single intermediate producer
is small relative to the economy. In this set up each producer in a sector faces the same
price elasticity of demand, ². Hence, the producer of a variety charges a constant markup
µ = ee−1 , where e is the price-elasticity of demand. Because the number of competitors is
large, e is equal to ². In section 5, we relax this assumption and assume instead that a finite
number of firms operate within each sector producing non-tradable varieties.16 Whether
the markup is fixed or endogenous, we assume instantaneous entry, which implies that the
zero profit condition holds at each instant of time.
Denoting by ki ≡ Ki/Li the capital-labor ratio for sector i = T,N , enables us to
express the production functions in intensive form, i.e. f
(
kT
) ≡ F (KT , LT ) /LT and
h
(
kN
) ≡ H (KN , LN) /LN . Production functions are supposed to take a Cobb-Douglas
form: f
(
kT
)
=
(
kT
)θT
, and h
(
kN
)
=
(
kN
)θN
, where θT and θN represent the capital
income share in output in the traded and non-traded sectors respectively. Since inputs can
move freely between the two sectors, marginal products in the traded and the non-traded
sector equalize:
θT
(
kT
)θT−1
=
P
µ
θN
(
kN
)θN−1 ≡ rK , (6a)(
1− θT ) (kT )θT = P
µ
(
1− θN) (kN)θN ≡W. (6b)
These static efficiency conditions state that the sectoral marginal products must equal the
labor cost W and capital rental rate rK .
2.3 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government which finances government expenditure
by raising lump-sum taxes Z in accordance with the balanced condition:17
GT + PGN = Z. (7)
Public spending consists of purchases of traded goods, GT , and non-traded goods, GN . As
the data suggests that government expenditure tends to be mainly on non-traded goods,
we concentrate on the effects of an increase in GN .18
16As stressed by Yang and Heijdra [1993], departing from the usual assumption made by Dixit and Stiglitz
[1977] implies that the price elasticity of demand becomes an increasing function of the number of firms and
that the markup is endogenous.
17Government spending on traded goods GT is considered for calibration purpose. The effects of a
permanent and temporary fiscal expansion on GT are explored in the Appendix, available on request.
18The data summarized in Table 3 reveal that the non-tradable content of government spending averages
about 90%.
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2.4 Short-Run Static Solutions
System (6a)-(6b) can be solved for sector capital intensity ratios: kT = kT (P ) and kN =
kN (P ). Using the fact that W ≡ θT (kT )θT−1, the wage rate also depends on P , i.e.
W =W (P ), withWP ≷ 0. An increase in the relative price P raises or lowersW depending
on whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector.
Plugging sectoral capital-labor ratios into the resource constraints and production func-
tions leads to short-term static solutions for sectoral output: Y T = Y T (K,L, P ) and
Y N = Y N (K,L, P ). According to the Rybczynski effect, a rise in K raises the output of
the sector which is more capital intensive, while a rise in L raises the output of the sector
which is more labor intensive. An increase in the relative price of non tradables exerts op-
posite effects on sectoral outputs by shifting resources away from the traded sector towards
the non-traded output.
By substituting first W = W (P ), eqs. (5a)-(5b) can be solved for consumption and
labor supply as follows: C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
with Cλ¯ < 0, CP < 0, and L = L
(
λ¯, P
)
with Lλ¯ > 0
and LP ≷ 0. A rise in the shadow value of wealth induces agents to cut their real expenditure
and to supply more labor. By raising the consumption price index, an appreciation in the
relative price of non tradables drives down consumption. Finally, depending on whether
kT ≷ kN , a rise in P stimulates or depresses labor supply by raising or lowering W .
2.5 Macroeconomic Dynamics
The adjustment of the open economy towards the steady-state is described by a dynamic
system which comprises two equations. First, the dynamic equation for the relative price
of non-traded goods (5d) equalizes the return on domestic capital and traded bonds r?.
Second, the accumulation equation for physical capital clears the non-traded goods market
along the transitional path. This can be written as:
K˙ =
Y N (K,L, P )
µ
− CN (λ¯, P )−GN − δKK. (8)
Dynamic equations (5d) and (8) form a separate subsystem in P andK. Inserting short-run
static solutions, linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting the
long-term values with a tilde, we obtain in a matrix form: K˙
P˙
 =
 Y NKµ − δK Y NPµ − CNP
0 Y
T
K
P˜
 K(t)− K˜
P (t)− P˜
 (9)
The determinant of the linearized 2× 2 matrix is unambiguously negative and the trace is
equal to r?.19 Hence, the equilibrium yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path,
irrespective of the relative sizes of the sectoral capital-labor ratios. Denoting the negative
19See the Appendix for further details.
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eigenvalue by ν1 and the positive eigenvalue by ν2, the general solutions for K and P are
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, P (t)− P˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t, (10)
where B1 and B2 are constants to be determined and ωi2 is the eigenvector associated with
the eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2). Two features of the two-sector economy’s equilibrium
dynamics deserve special attention. First, as long as the markup is fixed, if kT > kN , the
temporal path for the relative price remains flat for the no-arbitrage condition (5d) to be
fulfilled. Hence, in this case, ω12 = 0. If capital intensities are reversed, then ω
1
2 < 0. As a
consequence, the relative price exhibits transitional dynamics; P and K move in opposite
directions. Second, after a permanent fiscal shock, to ultimately approach the steady-state
(K˜, P˜ ) and to satisfy the transversality condition limt→∞ P (t)K(t)e−r
?t = 0, it is necessary
to set the arbitrary constant B2 equal to zero. When the expansionary policy is only
transitorily implemented (i.e. the fiscal shock only lasts for T periods), two periods have to
be considered, namely a first period (labelled period 1) over which the temporary policy is
in effect, and a second period (labelled period 2) after the policy has been removed. While
the small country converges towards its new long run equilibrium over period 2, i. e. B2
must be set to zero, the economy follows unstable paths over period 1. These are described
by eqs. (10).
Substituting eqs. (8) and (7) into eq. (3), we obtain the dynamic equation for the
current account (denoted by CA ≡ B˙):
B˙ = r?B + Y T (K,L, P )− CT (λ¯, P )−GT , (11)
where Y T −CT −GT correspond to net exports. Eq. (11) states that the current account is
equal to the balance of trade denoted by NX plus interest receipts on outstanding assets.
Linearizing (11) around the steady-state and substituting (10), the general solution for the
stock of foreign assets is given by:20
B(t) = B˜ +
[(
B0 − B˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t. (12)
When the disturbance is temporary, we must take into account that assets (i.e. domestic
capital and foreign bonds) have been accumulated (or decumulated) over the period 1.
The time path for net foreign assets is described by eq. (12) during this unstable period.
As stocks of assets are modified over period 1 (i.e. (0, T )), we have to take new initial
conditions (i.e. BT and KT ) into account when the fiscal policy is removed.21
20If kT > kN , then Φ1 = −P˜ < 0 and Φ2 = P˜ ν1
{
1 +
ω22
P˜ ν1
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δk)
]}
. If kN > kT ,
then Φ1 = P˜ ν2
{
1 +
ω12
P˜ ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]}
and Φ2 = −P˜ .
21Following a permanent budget policy, the economy moves along a stable path; hence, the trajectory for
B(t) is obtained by invoking the transversality condition limt→∞ λ¯B(t)e−r
?t = 0 which implies that B2 = 0.
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2.6 Steady-State
We will now discuss the salient features of the steady-state. Setting P˙ = 0 into eq. (5d), we
obtain the equality between the rate of return on domestic capital income and the exogenous
world interest rate, i.e.
hk
[
kN
(
P˜
)]
µ
− δK = r?. (13)
This equality determines the steady-state value of the relative price of non-tradables, i.e.
P˜ . Hence, the long-run level of P remains unaffected by a rise in government spending, as
long as the markup is fixed.
Setting K˙ = 0 into eq. (8) yields the market-clearing condition for the non-traded good:
Y N
(
K˜, L˜, P˜ ,
)
µ
= CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
+ I˜ +GN , (14)
where I˜ = δKK˜.
Setting B˙ = 0 into eq. (11) leads to the market-clearing condition for the traded good:
Y T
(
K˜, L˜, P˜
)
= −r?B˜ + CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
+GT . (15)
For the country to remain ultimately solvent, we have to impose one single and overall
intertemporal budget constraint:22
B0 − B˜ = Φ1
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (16)
where Φ1 < 0 describes the effect of capital accumulation on the the external asset position
and K0 and B0 are the initial conditions.23 The four equations (13)-(16) jointly determine
P˜ , K˜, B˜ and λ¯.
3 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: An Analytical Exploration
In this section, we explore analytically the macroeconomic effects of a temporary fiscal
expansion, emphasizing how traded and non-traded goods modify the propagation mech-
anism.24 Suppose that at time t = 0, the government raises public spending on the non-
traded good and at time T it removes the expansionary budget policy.25 The higher T ,
22Substituting first the short-run solutions, then linearizing the dynamic equation of the internationally
traded bonds (11) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, substituting the solutions for K(t) and P (t) and
finally invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal
budget constraint (16).
23Since for all parameterizations, Φ1 is always negative, we assume Φ1 < 0 from now thereon. Hence,
capital accumulation deteriorates the current account along the transitional path.
24As the shocks identified in the VAR literature are transitory, we focus the theoretical analysis on
temporary increases in government spending.
25We assume further that all agents perfectly understand at the outset the temporary nature of the policy
change. Hence, at time T , there is no new information and thereby no jump in the marginal utility of wealth
at this date.
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the stronger the persistence of the shock. For ease of computation, we first consider the
labor supply to be inelastically supplied; only in this case are we able to derive analytical
expressions for the impact effects of a temporary fiscal expansion, regardless of sectoral
capital intensities.26 At the end of this section, we discuss the implications of elastic labor
supply, when analytical expressions can be derived only if kT > kN .27
3.1 The Case of Inelastic labor Supply
We investigate both the impact and long-run effects of a temporary rise in GN by assuming
that the labor supply is fixed. In particular, we provide analytical expressions of impact
effects on key economic variables, namely investment and the current account.
Impact Effects
Let fist consider the situation when the traded sector is more capital intensive than
the non-traded sector. Since taxes must be raised to balance the budget, the subsequent
fall in the real disposable income induces agents to lower their consumption. Because the
reduction in real expenditure is spread over the two goods, the fall in consumption of the
non-traded good is not large enough to compensate for the rise in public spending GN .
Hence, an excess demand arises in the non-traded good market which produces a drop in
investment (see eq. (8)). Formally, the initial reaction of investment is given by
dI(0)
dGN
= αC
(
1− e−r?T
)
− 1 < 0, (17)
where αC is the non tradable content of consumption. The first term on the RHS of
(17) reflects the positive effect of the drop in CN on capital accumulation. As shown by
the second term on the RHS, the rise in GN withdraws resources from investment. Since
αC
(
1− e−r?T ) is smaller than one, a rise in GN unambiguously crowds-out investment on
impact. If public spending is raised over a short period (i.e. if T is small), agents reduce
their real expenditure by a small amount because the tax burden is low. Consequently,
the excess of demand in the non-traded good market increases, which drives down further
investment.
The adjustment of the current account is described by the market-clearing condition
for the traded good, i.e. eq (11). Since consumption in the traded good falls, net exports
increase which yields a current account surplus as the stock of traded bonds is initially
predetermined. After tedious computations, it can be shown that the initial reaction of the
current account is given by:
dCA(0)
dGN
= P˜ (1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (18)
26To derive formal solutions after a temporary fiscal shock, we applied the procedure developed by Schu-
bert and Turnovsky [2002].
27In deriving formal solutions after temporary fiscal shocks, without loss of generality, we assume that
the non-traded sector is perfectly competitive so that the markup is one, and that the rate of depreciation
of physical capital is zero. In the numerical analysis, we relax these two assumptions.
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where 1−αC is the tradable content of consumption. The current account surplus increases
with the length of the shock T as consumption in the traded good CT falls by a larger
amount.
If the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector, sectoral outputs
remain unaffected as the relative price P is unchanged and the capital stock is predeter-
mined.
The responses of investment and the current account change dramatically when the
capital intensities are reversed. The reason is that now, the relative price of non tradables
appreciates on impact as a result of the excess of demand in the non-traded good market.
The increase in P influences sectoral outputs by shifting resources from the traded sector
towards the non-traded sector. Since Y N now expands, the response of investment becomes
ambiguous as resources are devoted to capital accumulation. More formally, the reaction
of investment is given by:
dI(0)
dGN
=
(
ν2 − ν1
ν2
)(
1− e−ν2T )+ σCC˜N
λ¯
ν1
ν2
dλ¯
dGN
− 1, (19)
where
dλ¯
dGN
=
αC λ¯
σCC˜N
(
1− Ψ˜
1− αCΨ˜
)(1− e−ν2T )− (e−r?T − e−ν2T )(
1− Ψ˜
)
 > 0,
with 0 < Ψ˜ ≡ − r?
ν22
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2 < 1. The first term on the RHS of eq. (19) reflects the positive
influence on investment of the initial appreciation in the relative price of non tradables.
This term is positive and increasing with T . As shown by the second term on the RHS, the
wealth effect reflected by a rise in the marginal utility of wealth λ¯, now exerts a negative
impact on capital accumulation. The reason is that the drop in real disposable income
induces agents to reduce CN which in turn moderates the excess of demand in the non-
traded good market and thereby the appreciation in P . The last term on the RHS of eq.
(19) reflects the rise in GN that withdraws resources from physical capital accumulation.
Hence, investment may now respond positively to a fiscal shock as a result of the initial rise
in P .
Whereas the relative price appreciation of non-traded goods exerts a positive impact on
investment by raising non-traded output, it drives down net exports by depressing traded
output on impact, due to the shift of resources towards the non-traded sector. Regardless of
the length of the fiscal shock, we find that the current account unambiguously deteriorates
after an increase in GN :
dCA(0)
dGN
= −P˜
(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)
−ν1Φ1 (1− αC)
ν2
(
1− αCΨ˜
) [(1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
< 0.
(20)
where Φ1 = −P˜
(
1 + 1ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
)
< 0.
When kN > kT , the initial rise in the relative price of non tradables causes a shifting
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of labor away from the traded to the non-traded sector. Hence, Y N rises in the short-run
while Y T falls on impact.
Long-Run Effects
A temporary increase in government spending has permanent or long-run effects, be-
cause the model features the zero-root property.28 Since government spending reverts back
to its initial level at time T , in the long-run (i.e. in the steady-state) changes are only
driven by the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth. Confronted
with a fall in their disposable income, agents are induced to permanently lower their real
consumption. As consumption in the non-traded sector is reduced, non-traded output is
decreased as well in the long-run, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. Hence, labor
shifts from the non-traded to the traded sector, and traded output expands in the long-run.
The reason is that the small open economy decumulates traded bonds as a result of the
investment boom once the fiscal shock ends. To service the debt accumulated over the
transition, the economy must run a trade balance surplus in the long-run, which is achieved
through a drop in CT and a rise in Y T .
As labor is fixed, the long-run adjustment of GDP is driven by capital accumulation
which depends on sectoral capital intensities. Since Y N declines in the long-run to meet
lower demand, capital falls or rises depending on whether the non-traded sector is more or
less capital intensive, and so GDP decreases or increases.29
3.2 The Case of Elastic Labor Supply
We now clarify the role of labor supply in the transmission of fiscal policy.
Impact Effects
Let us first assume that the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded
sector. Following the drop in their disposable income, agents always cut their real expendi-
ture but also supply more labor. According to Rybczynski’s theorem, a rise in labor supply
raises the output of the sector which is more labor intensive.
The labor supply channel now makes the responses of investment and the current ac-
count ambiguous by affecting sectoral outputs. More precisely, the rise in non-traded out-
put implies that higher public spending GN may crowd in or crowd out capital investment.
Formally, the initial reaction of investment should now be rewritten as:
dI(0)
dGN
= −
1 + (1− e−r?T )
(
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ ν1 − σC P˜ C˜N
)
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≶ 0. (21)
Setting σL = 0 in eq. (21) yields eq. (17). As long as σL > 0, the sign of eq. (21)
28Technically, this follows from the assumption that β = r?, which requires the joint determination of the
transition and the steady-state.
29Formal expressions are derived by setting σL = 0 into (23).
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is no longer clear-cut. The more responsive the labor supply, the larger the increase in
employment on impact, and thereby the less likely it is that investment is crowded out by
public spending.
Turning to the initial response of the current account, we obtain after computation:
dCA(0)
dGN
= P˜
(
1− e−r?T
)1 +
(
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ ν1 − σC P˜ C˜N
)
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≷ 0. (22)
By depressing traded output, the increase in labor now makes a deterioration in the current
account possible. The higher the elasticity of labor supply σL, the more likely an initial
drop in the current account.
When kN > kT , the initial change in labor supply is the result of two opposite forces:
the wealth effect which induces agents to supply more labor and the appreciation in the
relative price of non tradable goods that counteracts this effect by driving down the wage
rate. Hence, employment may increase or decrease on impact. As will become clear in
Section 4, the elasticity σL plays a crucial role in driving the initial reaction of labor
supply, and thereby the change in GDP on impact. For clarity, let us assume that agents
supply more labor. Higher employment exerts a negative impact on non-traded output
and a positive influence on traded output.30 Hence, the increase in L makes a drop in
investment more likely as resources are shifted towards the traded sector. However, the
relative price of non-tradables exerts a positive impact on investment. Finally, the initial
current account reaction is no longer clear cut as net exports may fall or increase on impact.
More precisely, while a higher labor supply boosts traded output, the appreciation of the
real exchange rate exerts a negative impact on Y T . To sum up, if the relative price channel
predominates, investment is crowded in while the current account falls into deficit.
Long-Run Effects
The conclusions established in the case of an inelastic labor supply hold in the long run,
with the exception of the steady-state changes in physical capital and GDP. Regardless of
sectoral capital intensities, it is found that the open economy accumulates physical capital
as long as the labor supply is elastic enough. Using the fact that the steady-state capital
stock can be expressed as a function of the marginal utility of wealth and government
spending GN , and remembering than in the long-run, GN remains unchanged, the long-run
adjustment of physical capital is given by:31
dK˜
dGN
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
= − 1
λ¯ν1
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν1
) dλ¯
dGN
> 0, kT > kN , (23a)
dK˜
dGN
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
= − 1
λ¯ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
) dλ¯
dGN
≷ 0, kN > kT , (23b)
30We were unable to obtain analytical results for kN > kT . Yet, as shown numerically, the analytical
results for an inelastic labor supply hold.
31Solving (13)-(15) for P˜ , K˜ and B˜ yields: P˜ = constant, K˜ = K
(
λ¯, GN
)
and B˜ = B
(
λ¯, GN
)
. See the
Appendix for further details.
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where Kλ¯ represents the partial derivative of the steady-state capital stock w.r.t. the
shadow value of wealth λ¯, ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 are the stable and unstable roots, and
dλ¯/dGN > 0 reflects the wealth effect. If kT > kN , capital stock and labor supply are
positively correlated in the long-run, and a temporary fiscal expansion crowds in investment
in the long run. With the reversal of capital intensities, K˜ and L˜ move together only
if σCC˜N − σLL˜k˜T ν2 < 0. More precisely, if the labor supply is elastic enough, higher
employment triggers a drop in non-traded output to such an extent that capital stock must
increase to clear the non-traded good market. As we shall see in the next section, K˜
increases in all scenarios, even if σL is small.
4 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: A Quantitative Exploration
In this section, we analyze the effects of a temporary rise in government spending quanti-
tatively. For this purpose we solve the model numerically. We therefore discuss parameter
values first, before turning to the long- and short-term effects of the fiscal shock
4.1 Baseline Parametrization
We start by describing the calibration of consumption-side parameters that we use as a
baseline. The world interest rate which is equal to the subjective time discount rate β is set
to 1%. One period of time corresponds to a quarter. The elasticity of substitution between
traded and non-traded goods φ is set to 1.5 (see e.g. Cashin and Mc Dermott [2003]). An
additional critical parameter is ϕ which is set to 0.5 in the baseline calibration to target a
non tradable content in total consumption expenditure (i.e., αC) of 45%, in line with our
empirical evidence.32 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption σC is set
to 0.5 because empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggest values smaller than one.33 One
critical parameter is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply σL. In our
baseline parametrization, we set σL = 0.5, in line with evidence reported by Domeij and
Flode´n [2006].
We now describe the calibration of production-side parameters. We assume that physical
capital depreciates at a rate δK = 1.5% to target an investment-GDP ratio of 20%. The
shares of sectoral capital income in output take two different values depending on whether
the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. In line with
our estimates, if kT > kN , θT and θN are set to 0.4 and 0.3, respectively.34 Alternatively,
32Table 3 shows the non tradable content of GDP components for thirteen OECD countries.
33Consumption expenditure is 55% of GDP for our baseline calibration.
34Table 3 gives the values of θj (j = T,N) for thirteen OECD countries. The values of θT and θN we
have chosen correspond roughly to the averages for countries with kT > kN . For these values, the non
tradable content of GDP and labor are 63% and 66%, respectively. When kN > kT , we can use reverse but
symmetric values for θN so that the size of kT − kN remains unchanged. For θT = 0.3 and θN = 0.4, the
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when kN > kT , we choose θT = 0.3 and θN = 0.4. Setting the elasticity of substitution
between sectoral goods ω to 1 and the elasticity of substitution between varieties, ² to 4
yields a markup charged by the non-traded sector of 1.35, which is close to our estimates
(see Table 3).
We set GN and GT so as to yield a non-tradable share of government spending of 90%,
and government spending as a share of GDP of 20%.35 We consider three different scenarios
for the duration of the fiscal shock: a short-lived (T = 8), a medium-lived (T = 16), and a
long-lived (T = 32) fiscal shock. As the baseline scenario, we take the medium-lived fiscal
shock, i.e. a shock that lasts 16 quarters. In this case, the cumulative increase in government
spending corresponds approximately to the cumulative increase in US government spending
six years after an exogenous spending shock by one percentage point of GDP according to
the estimates reported by Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010]. For T = 16, we also conduct a sensitivity
analysis with respect to the elasticity of labor supply (i.e. we set σL to 0.1 and 1).
4.2 Long-Run Effects
Panel A of Table 1 gives the numerical results for the long-run effects of a temporary fiscal
expansion. In the baseline scenario, agents cut real expenditure by 0.07% of GDP while
they raise labor supply by 0.13% as a result of the decrease in real disposable income. The
open economy accumulates physical capital in the long-run, regardless of sectoral capital
intensities. This is because when kT > kN , the increase in employment produces an excess
of supply in the non-traded good market which calls for a long-run increase in capital that
yields a shift of labor towards the more capital intensive sector. This in turn raises traded
output and thereby net exports which allows the external debt accumulated in the short-
run to be serviced. If the capital intensities are reversed, the long-run rise in labor drives
down non-traded output. To clear the market, capital must be raised. Interestingly, while
GDP increases in all scenarios, the rise in GN always benefits the traded sector in the
long-run, irrespective of sectoral capital intensities. More precisely, remembering that the
relative price P remains unaffected by the fiscal shock in the long-run, traded output, i.e.
Y T = LT f
(
kT (P˜ )
)
, is only driven by employment LT . As the open economy must run a
trade balance surplus in the long-run, traded output and thereby labor in that sector must
increase. With regard to non-traded output, Y N decreases in all scenarios if kN > kT since
the open country experiences sizeable current account deficits in the short-run that require
significant long-run improvement in the balance of trade.
non tradable content of GDP and labor are 69% and 65%, respectively.
35Close to the average of the values reported in Table 3, the ratios GT /Y T and GN/Y N are 6% and 28%
in the baseline calibration.
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4.3 Short-Run Effects
We now turn to the short-run effects of the fiscal expansion. We take the medium-lived
spending shock as our baseline scenario, but we also refer to short-lived and long-lived fiscal
shocks, as the length of fiscal stimulus may vary across countries. Panels B and C of Table
1 show the results for this situation, as well as for a number of alternative scenarios. While
panel B gives the response on impact, panel C displays the cumulative responses over the
first two years (i.e. eight quarters) after the shock.
The transitional paths of key variables under the baseline scenario are displayed in Fig-
ures 1. The responses of GDP, investment and current account are expressed in percentage
of the initial steady-state output, while the real exchange rate is given as the percentage
deviation from the initial steady state. Horizontal axes measure quarters. When the reac-
tion of the variable is sensitive to the elasticity of labor supply, we compare the baseline
scenario (solid line) to alternative scenarios. The dashed-dotted line gives the results for
a low labor supply elasticity (i.e. σL = 0.1), while the dotted line shows those for a high
labor supply elasticity (i.e. σL = 1).
Before analyzing in the detail the role of sectoral reallocation in shaping the short-run
dynamics in response to a temporary increase in government spending, we should mention
the set of empirical evidence established by Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010]. It is found that in all
the countries in their sample, an exogenous increase in government spending raises output,
and induces a simultaneous decline of investment and the current account. In the following,
we discuss the predictions of our model for the behavior of these variables when kT > kN
and when kN > kT .
While employment and thereby GDP increase in all the scenarios where kT > kN , labor
supply and output increase slightly or decrease when the capital intensities are reversed.
The reason is that when kT > kN , agents are induced to supply more labor as a result of
the wealth effect. By contrast, when kN > kT , the appreciation of the real exchange rate
drives down the wage rate which in turn counteracts the wealth effect. Interestingly, we
find that employment and thereby GDP falls on impact if σL is raised from 0.5 to 1. The
reason is that for a given change in the shadow value of wealth, the relative price must
appreciate more as a result of the larger labor outflow. Hence, the consecutive decrease in
W is large enough to induce agents to supply less labor, which reduces GDP by 0.05% on
impact.
In the model, the initial reaction of investment is ambiguous as long as labor supply is
elastic. Numerically, we find that its short-run response depends heavily on sectoral capital
intensities. On impact, an increase in GN crowds out investment only if the traded sector
is more capital intensive. While non-traded output expands as a result of the increase in
labor supply, the rise in public spending GN produces an excess of demand which must be
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eliminated by a drop in investment. As shown in the seventh line of panel B of Table 1, the
less elastic labor supply is, the larger the crowding-out effect of investment. By contrast, if
the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, the increase in GN triggers an appreciation
in the relative price of non tradables P which stimulates Y N and thereby investment, in all
scenarios. The cumulative responses reported in the third line of panel C of Table 1 show
that a fiscal expansion crowds in investment by about 3.22% of initial GDP on impact if
kN > kT , while investment is crowded out by 3.16% if kT > kN . The investment boom
when kN > kT triggers a positive cumulative response of output, as summarized in the fifth
line of panel C in Table 1. By contrast, the decline in investment when kT > kN implies a
smaller cumulative response of GDP, across all scenarios.36
As shown in the eight line of panel B of Table 1, the open economy experiences a current
account deficit, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. When kT > kN , a larger labor
supply induces a shift of labor towards the non-traded sector, and the subsequent decrease
in traded output drives down net exports. When the capital intensities are reversed, the
appreciation in the real exchange rate more than offsets the positive effect of the labor
inflow on Y T . As a consequence, traded output falls which yields a current account deficit.
4.4 Transitional Adjustment
We now discuss the dynamic effects which are depicted in Figures 1, starting with the
adjustment of labor which is displayed in the third line. The dashed-dotted line shows the
results for a weakly responsive labor supply (i.e. σL = 0.1), while the dotted line shows the
results for a highly elastic labor supply (i.e. σL = 1). If the traded sector is more capital
intensive, the temporal path for L is flat as the relative price P remains unaffected. When
kN > kT , the dynamics for L no longer degenerate as a result of the depreciation in the real
exchange rate (after its initial appreciation) along the transitional path. The consequent
increase in the wage rate W induces agents to supply more labor during the transitional
period.
The transitional path of investment is also quite distinct, depending on whether the
traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. Along the transi-
tional path, capital accumulation clears the non-traded good market. When kT > kN , the
size of the crowding-out of investment reduces over time, but when kT > kN , investment de-
creases monotonically as the depreciation in the relative price P lowers non-traded output.
After about 2 years, the investment flow becomes negative and the open economy decumu-
lates physical capital until the fiscal policy is removed. At time T , government spending GN
36As shown in the fifth line of panel C in Table 1, the cumulative response of GDP at a two-year horizon
is negative in two scenarios when kT > kN : when σL is low and when the fiscal shock is short-lived. In
these two scenarios, the response of labor supply is limited, Y N rises less, and the excess demand in the
non-traded good market becomes larger, which in turn produces a larger decline in investment.
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reverts back to its initial level which releases resources for capital accumulation. Regardless
of sectoral capital intensities, investment is crowded in.
The temporal path for GDP is driven by the adjustments in both labor and capital. In
the case kT > kN , the dynamics for GDP are the mirror image of capital accumulation: the
slowdown in GDP growth as government spending is raised originates from the crowding
out of investment. By contrast, when kN > kT , the temporal path of output is hump-
shaped: GDP growth first increases as labor supply rises, and then slows down as a result
of the decline in investment which starts after about two years. At the time the fiscal
policy is removed, the economy experiences an investment boom which boosts GDP in
both cases. While in a one-sector model, the response of output increases with labor
supply responsiveness (as stressed by Baxter and King [1993]), this is not the case when
we consider a two-sector model. Considering that kT > kN and raising σL from 0.5 to 1
increases the cumulative GDP response from 0.32 to 0.55. By contrast, when kN > kT , the
reaction of GDP decreases from 0.69 to 0.58, as a result of the drop in the wage rate which
depresses labor supply.
Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, the current account stays in deficit while gov-
ernment spending is raised. In the case kT > kN , the decumulation of physical capital
drives down traded output, which in turn amplifies the current account deficit along the
transitional path. If the sectoral capital intensities are reversed, the depreciation in the
relative price of non tradables moderates the decrease in Y T and thereby the worsening in
the foreign asset position. Yet, in the latter case, the current account deficit at an horizon
of two years is almost three times larger, as shown in the fourth line of panel C of Table 1.
4.5 Sectoral Decomposition of the Effects of Fiscal Shocks
The sectoral decomposition of the effects of fiscal shocks sheds light on the propagation
mechanism in an open economy. The impact and cumulative responses of sectoral outputs
are summarized in the last two lines of panels B and C of Table 1, respectively. Interestingly,
the sectoral outputs change in opposite directions, both on impact and along the transitional
path. In the benchmark scenario, assuming that kT > kN , agents raises the labor supply by
0.12% which induces a shift of employment towards the more labor intensive sector. As a
result, non-traded output increases by 0.32% of GDP while traded output declines by 0.24%
of GDP. If sectoral capital intensities are reversed, the appreciation in the relative price of
non-tradables is large enough to more than offset the Rybczynski effect which boosts non-
traded output by 1% of initial GDP while the traded sector experiences a decline by the same
amount. Hence, GDP remains unchanged on impact in the case kN > kT . Interestingly,
raising σL amplifies the dispersion of sectoral output responses as agents supply less labor.
The fifth line of Figure 1 depicts the transitional paths of sectoral outputs expressed as
19
percentage deviations from the initial steady-state values scaled by the initial GDP. The
solid line depicts the transitional path for traded output while the dotted line shows the
dynamics for Y N . Along the transitional path, sectoral outputs vary in opposite directions
as a result of the reallocation of inputs across sectors. When kT > kN , capital decumulation
produces a fall in traded output while non-traded output expands. Whereas sectoral outputs
diverge in this configuration, Y T and Y N converge when kN > kT . More precisely, the
relative price depreciation raises traded output whereas the fall in P drives down non-
traded output. Finally, as shown in the two last lines of panel A of Table 1, long-run GDP
growth is driven by traded output growth. The rise in traded output is required in the
long-run to produce an improvement in the balance of trade, regardless of sectoral capital
intensities.
4.6 Taking the Model to the Data
Since time-series evidence on the effects of fiscal shocks, in particular on key variables like
investment, current account, and GDP, is now available, we decided to compare our model’s
predictions withe the empirical results.
Three notable papers have estimated the effects of fiscal shocks on the trade balance:
Beetsma, Giuludori and Klassen [2008], Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010], Monacelli and Perotti
[2010]. While the first paper includes only GDP and trade variables in its VAR model, the
other two also include components of GDP such as investment. All these papers use the
Blanchard-Perotti identification scheme that assumes that government spending is prede-
termined within the quarter relative to the other variables included in the VAR model. Yet,
they differ in their sample of countries: Beetsma et al. [2008] consider fourteen European
Union countries and use a panel vector auto-regression approach; Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010]
and Monacelli and Perotti [2010] estimate the effects of fiscal shocks for four countries:
Canada, Australia, the UK and the US. All three papers find that an exogenous increase
in government spending raises output and lowers the current account. Additionally, Cardi
and Mu¨ller and Monacelli and Perotti report a substantial decline in investment following
a fiscal expansion. The ability of our model to predict such empirical facts is mixed, as it
relies upon sectoral capital intensities.
A rise in government spending crowds out investment only if the traded sector is more
capital intensive than the non-traded sector. The reason is that when kN > kT , the relative
price of non-tradables appreciates on impact, which produces a reallocation of resources
towards the non-traded sector so that investment is crowded in on impact, irrespective
of the shock’s duration or the elasticity of labor supply. It is worthwhile noting that a
one-sector small open economy model (see e.g., Karayalc¸in [1999]) cannot produce a drop
in investment after a fiscal shock because the increased labor supply raises the marginal
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product of capital which leads to more investment.
We find that the current account deteriorates in all our model scenarios, in line with
empirical evidence. In the model, the short-run worsening in the foreign asset position
originates from the drop in the traded output caused by the labor shift towards the non-
traded sector. When kT > kN , the fall in Y T is triggered by the Rybczynski effect. If
sectoral capital intensities are reversed, the real exchange rate appreciation produces the
decline in Y T .
Empirical studies generally find that a fiscal expansion tends to raise output. Our model
produces a significant increase in GDP on impact in the benchmark scenario if kT > kN
since the real wage does not decrease in this case. If kN > kT , output is almost unaffected.
Yet, in this case, the cumulative response of GDP at an horizon of two years becomes
substantial across all scenarios, as shown in the fifth line of panel C of Table 1.
It is interesting to compare our results when kT > kN (panel C of Table 2) with
the numbers documented in empirical studies. By estimating a VAR model on quarterly
time-series data for the U.S., Australia, the U.K, and Canada, covering the period 1980-
2007, Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010] find that cumulative impulse responses after two years range
between 0.3 and 1.1 for output, between -0.1 and -1.1 for investment, and -0.1 and -1.8 for
the current account. While our model overpredicts both the crowding out of investment
and the current account deficit, it predicts pretty well the GDP response, falling in the
range of VAR evidence.
Finally, since our model predicts the sectoral impact of fiscal shocks, it is interesting
to compare our results with empirical data in this area. Only a few previous studies have
estimated the effects of a boost to government spending on sectoral outputs. Among these,
Be´ne´trix and Lane [2010] find that fiscal spending shocks generate a shift in the sectoral
composition of output as public purchases disproportionately benefit the non-traded sector.
This finding is in line with our numerical results reported in the two last lines of panel B
of Table 1. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities and across all the scenarios, a rise in
government spending boosts non-traded output, more so if the non-traded sector is more
capital intensive.
————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 1 about here >
————————————————————-
————————————————————-
< Please insert Figure 1 about here >
————————————————————-
21
5 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: The Case of Endogenous
Markup
Several papers have stressed that the variation in the number of competitors and the con-
secutive change in the markup provides an important magnification mechanism, see e.g.,
Jaimovich and, Floetotto [2008], Wu and Zhang [2000], Zhang [2007], all of whom consider
one-sector models. We therefore decide to revisit quantitatively the effects of temporary
fiscal shocks by allowing for the markup to be endogenous. Since the long-run effects remain
almost unchanged compared to those the case of fixed markup, we will not discuss them
further. Rather, we will concentrate on how an endogenous markup modifies the short-run
adjustment of key variables and influences the sectoral composition of GDP.
Before analyzing in detail the role of sectoral reallocation in shaping the short-run
dynamics in response to a temporary increase in government spending, we recall the con-
clusions of empirical studies. Perotti [2007] finds that the real wage responds positively to
a fiscal shock. Estimates by Monacelli and Perotti [2010] show that the real exchange rate
depreciates in the U.S., Australia, the U.K. and Canada, while Enders et al. [2011] confirm
this finding for the U.S. As shown in section 4, a two-sector model can produce the positive
impact on output and the simultaneous drop in investment and the current account after
a fiscal shock as long as the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded
sector. However, it fails to produce the real exchange rate depreciation or the rise in the
real wage. Since markup variations affect the relative price P and the wage rate W , we
decide to investigate whether the predictive power of the two-sector model would improve
if the markup were endogenous.
5.1 Extending the Model to Endogenous Markup
So far, we adopted the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption according to which the number of com-
petitors is large enough within each sector to yield a fixed price-elasticity of demand. Yet,
as emphasized by Yang and Heijdra [1993], the Dixit and Stiglitz’s [1977] assumption is an
approximation when the sectoral good is aggregated from a finite number of intermediate
goods. Following Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008], we depart from the usual practice by
assuming that the number of firms is large enough that the strategic effects can be ignored,
but not so large that the effect of entry on the firm’s demand curve is minuscule. Con-
sequently, the price elasticity of demand faced by a single firm is no longer constant and
equal to the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, but rather a function of
the number of firms N . Taking into account that output of one variety does not affect the
general price index P , but does influence the sectoral price level, in a symmetric equilibrium
22
the resulting price elasticity of demand is given by:37
e (N) = ²− (²− ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (24)
Assuming that ² > ω, the price elasticity of demand faced by any single firm is an increasing
function of the number of firms N within a sector. Henceforth, the markup µ = ee−1
decreases as the number of competitors increases.
In the interest of space, we restrict our attention to the major changes in deriving
the macroeconomic equilibrium. First, the zero-profit condition in the intermediate good
sector can be solved for the number of firms, i.e. N = N (K,L, P ). Bearing in mind that
µ = µ (N), the equalities of marginal products between sectors (i.e., eqs. (6)) imply that
capital-labor ratios kj (j = T,N) are affected by the markup and so by the number of firms,
i.e. kj = kj (P, µ). Substituting the capital-labor ratios into θT
(
kT
)θT−1 ≡ W to solve
for the wage rate, and into the resource constraints (i.e., eqs. (??)) and the production
functions to solve for the sectoral outputs, short-run static solutions become:
W =W (P, µ) , Y T = Y T (K,P,L, µ) , Y N = Y N (K,P,L, µ) , (25)
where Wµ ≶ 0 depending on whether kT ≷ kN , Y Tµ > 0 and Y Nµ < 0. To understand this
result intuitively, i.e. the impact of markup variations, let us consider that the number of
competitors increases so that µ falls. All things being equal, since the ratio P/µ rises, non-
traded output Y N increases while traded output Y T falls. Additionally, if kT > kN , a fall in
the markup µ raises the capital-labor ratios and thereby the wage rate. As a consequence,
Y N rises further and Y T declines more because the increased real wage induces households
to raise labor supply which shifts towards the more labor intensive sector. The same logic
applies in the case kN > kT but W falls.
5.2 Short-Run Effects
We now investigate the short-term effects of fiscal shocks when the markup is endogenous,
focusing on the shift in the real exchange rate and the adjustment of the real wage. The
latter has been estimated as the ratio of the wage rate to the consumption price index.
Numerical results for impact and cumulative effects are summarized in panels B and C of
Table 2.38 The baseline calibration is identical to that described in section 4.1.
Case kT > kN
We first consider the situation when the traded sector is more capital intensive. As
the number of firms, and thereby the markup, adjusts over time, the dynamics for the real
exchange rate are restored and driven by the no-arbitrage equation according to which the
37Details of the derivation can be found in the Appendix.
38To aid comprehension, panel B of Table 2 also shows the initial reaction of the wage rate W .
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return on domestic capital must be equalized with the return on traded bonds:
hk
{
kN [P, µ (N)]
}
µ (N)
+
P˙
P
− δK = r?. (26)
The markup µ depends on the number of firms N which drives profits down towards zero
in the non-traded sector at each instant of time. Since non-traded output is expected to
increase while government spending GN is raised, it creates profit opportunities in that
sector. Hence, the number of firms increases over time, which lowers the markup. The
subsequent decrease in the return of capital hk/µ triggered by the rise in kN requires a fall
in the relative price of non-traded goods. As shown in the second line of panel B of Table 2,
P drops on impact across all scenarios, as long as kT > kN . While the initial depreciation
in P is fairly small, the first line of panel C reveals that the real exchange rate depreciation
becomes substantial at an horizon of two years.
The reaction of the wage rate is the result of two opposite forces: the fall in the markup
which raises W and the decline in P that lowers it. As shown in the third line of panel B of
Table 2, the wage rate decreases on impact as the relative price channel predominates. The
second line of panel C shows that the two-year horizon cumulative response of the real wage
is negative for the baseline scenario. Yet, as displayed in Figure 1, the dynamic path for
the real wage shows that it increases along the transitional path and exceeds its initial level
after about 6 quarters. Only if the fiscal shock is short-lived or long-lived (i.e., GN is raised
over 8 or 32 quarters), does the cumulative response of the real wage becomes positive.
After a long-lived fiscal shock, both non-traded output expansion and, as a consequence,
firm entry are larger. Hence, the decline in the markup is large enough to produce a positive
cumulative response of the real wage. Following a short-lived fiscal shock, the real exchange
rate appreciates rapidly after its short-term depreciation, and it has a positive impact on
the wage rate.
Let now investigate how the markup variations modify the responses of key economic
variables, relative to those obtained with a fixed markup. First, as a result of the initial
drop in the wage rate, labor supply increases more moderately. Second, the real exchange
rate depreciation induces a shift of resources towards the traded sector. As shown in the
two last lines of panel B of Table 2, while non-traded output increases very slightly on
impact in the baseline scenario, Y N decreases substantially if the fiscal shock is short-lived
(i.e., T = 8) or the labor supply is weakly responsive (i.e., σL = 0.1), because the wealth
effect is smaller or the labor supply reacts less to the wealth effect. As a consequence,
investment is crowded out by a larger amount (almost 1% of initial GDP rather than 0.66%
when the markup is fixed). Third, as the relative price P depreciates, traded output now
expands (instead of declining) in all scenarios, except that of a long-lived fiscal shock. While
the initial increase in Y T triggers a small current account surplus on impact, panel C of
Table 2 reveals that the external asset position worsens very rapidly and dramatically in
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the short-run. Fourth, as labor the supply increases less, the cumulative response of GDP
summarized in panel C remains smaller than when the markup is fixed.
To summarize, the two-sector model can produce a real exchange rate depreciation but
fails to trigger a positive cumulative response of the wage rate for the baseline duration of
the fiscal shock, i.e. T = 16.
Case kN > kT
While the two-sector model does a fairly good job of accommodating most of the evi-
dence reported by empirical studies if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the
non-traded sector, the predictive power of the two-sector model is weak if sectoral capital
intensities are reversed.
When kN > kT , non-traded output is expected to increase sizeably after a temporary
increase in GN . The consequent flow of entries triggers a substantial decline in the markup.
The drop in µ now raises the return on domestic capital, which requires a real exchange
rate appreciation. This prediction contradicts the empirical evidence. The real exchange
rate appreciation, together with the decline in the markup, drive down the wage rate. As
the cost of consumption goods increases, the real wage falls substantially. The last line of
Figure 1 reveals that the real wage fails to exceed its original value along the transitional
path.
The GDP response to a fiscal shock when kN > kT is negative in most of scenarios, due
the substantial decline in the real wage which exerts a negative impact on labor supply.
More precisely, L increases only if σL is low or the fiscal shock is long-lived. Furthermore,
the competition channel amplifies the increase in investment. The reason is that, as inter-
mediate good producers in the non-traded sector perceive a more elastic demand, they are
induced to produce more. Since Y N increases by a larger amount than in the case of a fixed
markup, investment is further crowded in.
Whereas non-traded output expands substantially, traded output falls dramatically
across all scenarios as a result of the appreciation in the real exchange rate and the smaller
markup. The subsequent decline in net exports drives the current account into a larger
deficit than with a fixed markup.
————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 2 about here >
————————————————————-
5.3 Sectoral Effects
We now turn to the sectoral impact of fiscal policy. This will allow us to investigate whether
the competition channel amplifies or reduces the heterogeneity in sectoral output responses.
When kT > kN , the competition channel modifies the distribution of the increase in
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GDP across sectors substantially, as summarized in the two last lines of panel B of Table
2. With a fixed markup, traded output falls in all scenarios, while the fiscal shock boosts
non-traded output. But if µ is endogenous, the real exchange rate depreciation is strong
enough to boost traded output on impact, as long as the fiscal shock does not last too long.
The reason is that when the fiscal shock is long-lived, the wealth effect is substantial and
thereby counteracts the negative impact on L of the decline in W . As a consequence, the
labor supply increases substantially and shifts towards the non-traded sector.
With regard to the transitional dynamics, as shown in the sixth line of Figure 1, while
the real exchange rate continues to depreciate, the crowding-out of investment together with
the rise in labor supply boost Y N but depress Y T . In a nutshell, due to the intersectoral
reallocation of resources, the transitional adjustment of Y T is the mirror image of the
dynamics of Y N . The results displayed in the two last lines of panel C of Table 2 show that
with an endogenous markup, the cumulative responses of traded and non-traded output are
-3.84% and 4.05% of initial GDP respectively, while the cumulative responses are -4.11%
and 4.42%, respectively, with a fixed markup. Hence, when kT > kN , the decline in µ
reduces the heterogeneity in the responses of sectoral outputs. Nevertheless, the fall in
traded output remains substantial after two years. Once the fiscal shock ends, non-traded
output starts decreasing (as investment is crowded in), while traded output rises. In the
long-run, GDP growth is mostly driven by the rise in traded output.
If kN > kT , the patterns of the transitional adjustment of sectoral output remain
approximately the same as those found with a fixed markup. Yet, the competition channel
amplifies the dispersion of sectoral output responses. More precisely, non-traded output
rises by more than 2% of initial GDP (rather than about 1% when the markup is fixed).
In conclusion, regardless of sectoral capital intensities and whether the markup is fixed
or not, non-traded output always expands significantly following a temporary increase in
public spending. Allowing for the markup to depend on the number of competitors, the nu-
merical analysis reveals that the competition channel moderates or amplifies the responses
of sectoral outputs, depending on whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive
than the non-traded sector.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the open economy version of the two-sector neoclassical
model with traded and non-traded goods can account for the empirical evidence on the
effects of fiscal shocks, but only if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-
traded sector. In particular, a robust conclusion emerging from empirical papers is that
government spending tends to crowd out both investment and the current account. Con-
sidering both traded and non-traded goods enables the model to account for this finding,
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whereas the standard one-sector small open-economy framework cannot. In addition, by
enabling the markup to depend negatively on the number of competitors, the model can
generate a counter-cyclical markup which is pivotal to producing the real exchange rate de-
preciation which has recently been documented in the empirical literature. The subsequent
decline in the consumption price index and the positive impact of the lower markup on the
wage rate produces an increase in the real wage, although only if the fiscal shock is short-
or long-lived, not if it holds for a medium term.
In addition to the ability of the two-sector economy model to provide a better under-
standing of the fiscal transmission mechanism in an open economy, it delivers interesting
insights into the sectoral effects of fiscal shocks. The numerical analysis reveals that the
relative size of the non-traded sector increases substantially in the short-run, in line with
the evidence reported by Be´ne´trix and Lane [2010]. Our numerical results also show that in
the long-run, the relative size of the traded sector increases to service the debt accumulated
in the short-run. Hence, GDP growth is mostly driven by the rise in traded output in
the long-run. Along the transitional path, in all scenarios, the outputs of the two sectors
move in opposite direction. More precisely, traded output can either fall or rise during the
transition period when government spending is raised, depending on whether the traded
sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector.
The duration of the fiscal shock plays also a pivotal role in driving the responses of both
aggregate and sectoral variables. In all the scenarios, both labor supply and GDP increase
more when the fiscal expansion is implemented over a long rather than a short period. The
multiplier can exceed one only in this case, while the dispersion of responses of sectoral
outputs is amplified.
In conclusion, we must stress a number of caveats. If the non-traded sector is assumed to
be the more capital intensive sector, the model fails to match the evidence along a number of
dimensions. Notably, in this case, the two-sector model fails to account for the crowding-out
of investment which is one of the most consistent responses to a fiscal shock documented in
the empirical literature. Additionally, if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the
non-traded sector, the model cannot produce a positive cumulative response of the real wage
in the baseline scenario. Finally, due to our assumption of perfect mobility across sectors,
traded and non-traded output vary in opposite direction while evidence by Be´ne´trix and
Lane [2010] mostly predict that sectoral outputs co-vary. Further analysis of these issues
has to be left for future research.
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Figure 1: Effect of government spending shocks. Notes: variables are measured in percent-
age points of output, with the exception of employment, the real exchange rate and real
wage which are scaled by their initial steady-state values.
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A Data
In this Appendix, we describe how we split output, labor and GDP components into a
traded sector and a non-traded sector. Table 3 shows the non-tradable content of GDP,
employment, consumption, gross fixed capital formation and government spending. Table
3 also shows the share of government spending on the traded and non-traded good in the
sectoral output, the shares of capital income in output in both sectors, and the markup
charged by the non-traded sector for 13 OECD countries. The choice of these countries has
been dictated by data availability. For the countries of our sample, the period runs from
1970 to 2004.39
For output and employment, we used the methodology proposed by De Gregorio et al.
[1994], who treat Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Total
Manufacturing, Transport and Storage and Communication as traded goods. Electricity,
Gas and Water Supply, Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants,
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services, Community Social and Personal
Services are classified as non-traded sectors (Source: EU KLEMS [2007]). The non-tradable
shares of output and labor, shown in the first and second column of Table 3, average to
65% and 63%, respectively.
To split consumption expenditure into consumption in traded and non-traded goods,
we made use of the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP) pub-
lished by the United Nations (Source: United Nations [2007]). Among the twelve items, the
following ones are treated as consumption in traded goods: Food and Non-Alcoholic Bev-
erages, Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco and Narcotics, Clothing and Footwear, Furnishings,
Household Equipment, Transport, Miscellaneous Goods and Services. The remaining items
are treated as consumption in non-traded goods: Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Fu-
els, Health, Communication, Recreation and Culture, Education, Restaurants and Hotels.
The non-tradable share of consumption shown in the third column of Table 3 averages to
45%, in line with the share reported by Stockman and Tesar [1995].
With regard to investment, we follow the methodology proposed by Burstein et al. [2004]
who treat Housing and Other Construction as non-tradable investment and Products of
agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture, Metal products and machinery, Transport
Equipment as tradable investment expenditure (Source: OECD Input-Output database
[2008a]). Non tradable share of investment shown in the fourth column of Table 3 averages
to 60%, in line with estimates provided by Burstein et al. [2004].
Sectoral government expenditure data were obtained from the Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook (Source: IMF [2007]) and the OECD General Government Accounts
database (Source: OECD [2008b]). Adopting Morshed and Turnovsky’s [2004] method-
ology, the following four sectors were treated as traded: Fuel and Energy; Agriculture,
39The exception is consumption expenditure. Data start in 1976 for Austria, in 1995 for Belgium, in 1975
for Finland, in 1991 for Germany, in 1987 for Netherlands, in 1995 for Spain and in 1993 for Sweden. Data
end in 2004 for all countries except Japan (1999) and the U.S. (2000).
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Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting; Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction; Transport and
Communications. The sectors treated as non-traded are: Government Public Services; De-
fense; Public Order and Safety; Education; Health; Social Security and Welfare; Housing
and Community Amenities; Recreation Cultural and Community Affairs. The non tradable
component of government spending shown in the fifth column of Table 3 averages to 90%.
The proportion of government spending on the traded and non-traded good (i.e., GT /Y T
and GN/Y N ) are shown in the sixth and seventh column of Table 3. They average to 7%
and 32%, respectively.
Markups in the non-traded sector were estimated at the industry level in each country
and aggregated as follows to construct the markup: µ =
∑6
j=1 ωj µj where ωj is the nominal
value-added weight of industry j in the non-traded sector. Estimates of µj were obtained
by applying the methodology developed by Roeger [1995]. The testable equation is:
yj,t = βj xj,t + εj,t, (27)
where the dependent variable yj,t is the Solow residual - percentage change in output less
the percentage change in inputs (each input is weighted by the corresponding income share
in output) - and xj,t is the output growth minus capital growth.40 Estimate of µj is equal
to 1/(1 − βˆj). Variables required to apply the Roeger’s method are the following: gross
output (at basic current prices), compensation of employees, intermediate inputs at current
purchasers prices, and capital services (volume) indices. All these variables are compiled
from the EU KLEMS database (Source: EU KLEMS [2007]), with the exception of the
user cost of capital rt. No sector-specific information was available to construct rt; hence,
the capital user cost is calculated as rt(≡ rj,t) = pI (i− piGDP + δK), with pI the deflator
for business non residential investment, i the long-term nominal interest rate, piGDP the
GDP deflator based inflation rate; the rate of depreciation δK is set to 5%; pI , i and
piGDP were taken from the OECD Annual National Accounts database (Source OECD
[2008c]). To tackle the potential endogeneity of the regressor and the heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation of the error term when estimating (27), we use the correction of Newey
and West [1993].41 According to the estimates given in the last column of Table 3, the
markup charged by the non-traded sector averages to 1.39.
40Formally, yt = ∆(pj,tYj,t) − αL,t∆(wj,tLj,t) − αM,t∆(mj,tMj,t) − (1− αL,t − αM,t)∆ (rtKj,t) and
xj,t = ∆(pj,tYj,t) − ∆(rtKj,t). We denote by αi,t for i = L,M,K the share of a generic input (labor,
material and capital) on total output, ∆ (pj,tYj,t) the nominal output growth in industry j, ∆ (wj,tLj,t) the
nominal labor cost growth, ∆ (mj,tMj,t) the growth in nominal intermediate input costs and ∆ (rtKj,t) the
nominal capital cost growth.
41Countries estimates for each µˆj are not reported here to save space, but are available on request.
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